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THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN LAW 
OF THE SEA DISPUTES
Darío Maestro*
I. Introduction: The Practice of Jurisdiction Collisions
International dispute resolution has achieved an unparalleled level of 
global popularity, with a noticeable proliferation of new dispute resolution 
forums since World War II. And yet the jurisdictional boundaries between 
international courts have never been more conceptually footloose. Adjudica-
tion of international disputes by a range of courts and arbitral tribunals
1
—
combined with improved access by private parties and the ability to rely on 
domestic legal systems to enforce the tribunals’ judgments—have together 
expanded the parties’ freedom of choice in late modernity.
But, when jurisdiction coincides in two or more forums, to which one 
should the parties in dispute have recourse? What are the legal remedies that 
most effectively will repair their rights? And what forces must we employ to 
reconcile conflicting interpretations of the very same rule? Answers to these 
questions have divided academics across decades. At one end, advocates of 
a fragmented system defend the increasing number of independent interna-
tional courts as empowering more parties to submit their disputes to interna-
tional adjudication and, even more importantly, characterize fears of con-
flicting jurisprudence as overstated.
2
At the other end, detractors insist that 
fragmentation threatens the coherence of international law and diminishes 
parties’ certainty of obtaining legal redress.
3
Failure to settle on a single in-
* University of Michigan Law School, LL.M. This note represents an extended and 
revised version of a paper presented as part of Professor Daniel Halberstam’s “European Un-
ion Law” course at Michigan Law. I appreciate comments from Professor Steven Ratner and 
the members of this Journal.
1. I will use the terms “court” and “tribunal” interchangeably in this piece.
2. See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002); Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmen-
tation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 903 (2004) (arguing that the evidence does not support that international law is yet 
fragmented, and that serious inconsistencies between individual tribunals have not material-
ized); Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004).
3. G. Hafner, Risks Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International Law, in Interna-
tional Law Commission, Report of the Working Group on Long-term Programme of Work, 
ILC (LII)/WG/LT/L.1/Add. 1 (25 July 2000), at 26 (“The disintegration of the legal order is 
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terpretation of a given issue could result in divergent case-law and quasi-
systematic appeals to courts of different areas of law or different target re-
gions. Naturally, this would imply higher litigation costs and also longer 
wait times for a final decision.
The success of international litigation rests on the willingness of liti-
gants to submit to the jurisdiction of the myriad of international courts and 
tribunals established by treaties and ad hoc agreements. Currently, interna-
tional law operates under a multi-tiered judicial system. There are courts of 
all-inclusive jurisdiction, such as the International Court of Justice (the 
“ICJ”)
4
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS” or 
the “Law of the Sea Tribunal”).
5
There are courts of geographically-
delimited jurisdiction, such as the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “Eu-
ropean Court”),
6
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”),
7
and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“ICtHR”).
8
Finally, there are ad
conducive to jeopardizing the authority of international law. Doubts could be raised as to 
whether international law will be able to achieve one of its primary objectives, dispute avoid-
ance and the stabilization of international relations and, thus, achieve its genuine function of 
law. The credibility, reliability and, consequently, authority of international law would be im-
paired.”); see also Judge Stephen M. Scwebel, President, Int’l Ct. Justice, Address to the Ple-
nary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 26, 1999) (arguing that the 
creation of new individual courts significantly increases the possibilities for conflicting inter-
pretations of international law); Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President, Int’l Ct. of Justice, Ad-
dress to the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 26, 2000) (stating that the emerging pro-
spect of new international tribunals “gives rise to a serious risk of conflicting jurisprudence[,] 
as the same rule of law might be given different interpretations in different cases”); John J. 
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995) (sug-
gesting that misplaced reliance on international adjudication is likely to lead to more conflict 
in the future).
4. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
5. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 20, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over all disputes concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”), subject to the provisions of article 297. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction also in-
cludes all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction 
on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), according to article 21 of the 
Tribunal’s Statute. A number of multilateral agreements conferring jurisdiction on the Tribu-
nal have been concluded to date. Due to this broader rationae personae jurisdiction, I opt to 
classify ITLOS as an all-inclusive or general jurisdiction court here. For an account of the role 
of ITLOS in international law, see Michael Wood, The International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea and General International Law, 22 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 351 (2007).
6. See generally Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1. I very much believe that European courts are also interna-
tional courts, and that European courts obviously have to apply not only Community law but 
also international law. The approach adopted in this note therefore presents the existing EU 
courts among the rest of the international courts.
7. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
32, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005.
8. See Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights art. 2, Oct. 31, 1979, AG/RES. 448 (IX-0/79).
2020] Jurisdiction Collisions in the Law of the Sea 655
hoc courts that apply a combination of international and domestic law on a 
situational basis. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (“ICTY”)
9
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) fall in this latter category,
10
commonly referred to as courts of is-
sue-specific jurisdiction.
11
The ongoing proliferation of international courts has increased the fre-
quency with which disputes fulfill the jurisdiction and admissibility requi-
sites of two or more fora,
12
creating what this note calls a jurisdiction colli-
sion. Jurisdiction collisions lead to a couple of negative consequences: They 
provoke a dash to different court houses—sometimes even by the same liti-
gant.
13
They also lead to inconsistent lawmaking in scenarios in which the 
same doctrine is simultaneously developed in two different forums, leading 
to differing tests for the same issue.
14
When that happens, and there are con-
flicting interpretations of international norms, where should a tribunal look 
for the standard that best reflects international consensus? In international 
law, no principles are available to reconcile differing judgments by interna-
9. See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yu-
goslavia since 1991, Updated Statute arts. 6, 8, 9 (Sept. 2009), https://www.icty.org/
x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf.
10. See S.C. Res. 955, annex arts. 5, 7, 8 (Nov. 8, 1994).
11. See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 253–54 (2d ed. 2010).
12. See Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 857 (2004).
13. For example, the State of Qatar launched multiple proceedings against the UAE 
(and others) based on distinct legal claims in 2018. These include three cases at the ICJ—
based on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (“CERD”), the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and the 1944 International 
Air Services Transit Agreement, respectively—and an inter-state complaint before the 
CERD’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Application of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. U.A.E.),
Provisional Measures, 2018 I.C.J. 406 (July 23); Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the 
ICAO Council Under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Bahr., 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia & U.A.E. v. Qatar), Order, 2018 I.C.J. 498 (July 25); Appeal Relating to 
the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council Under Article II, Section 2, of the 1944 International Air 
Services Transit Agreement (Bahr., Egypt, Saudi Arabia & U.A.E. v. Qatar), Order, 2018 
I.C.J. 501 (July 25); Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD Committee], 
Jurisdiction of the Inter-State Communication Submitted by Qatar Against the United Arab 
Emirates, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/99/3 (Aug. 30, 2019).
14. In this sense, the ECJ and the ECtHR maintain different approaches in the treat-
ment of third-country nationals concerning statutory social security. See Frans Pennings, The
Approaches of the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights Vis-À-Vis 
Discrimination on the Ground of Nationality in Social Security, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
EUROPEAN SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 121 (Pennings et al., eds., 2015). Clashes have also been 
frequent in respect of the European asylum system. See generally Lina Vosyliute, The ECtHR 
and the ECJ Overlapping Jurisdictions on Common EU Asylum Policy Issues: What Matters 
(3d European Public Policy Conference Budapest, Migration in Europe: Challenges and Op-
portunities, Apr. 18–19, 2011).
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tional courts.
15
Due to variations in procedure and substantive law, when the 
same legal dispute can be referred to more than one international court, the 
authoritative responses each provides—each according to its own remit and 
foundational title—will vary largely from one another. Moreover, the pleth-
ora of international courts is not organized, either horizontally or vertically, 
and so participants in the international legal system are without a hierarchy 
of precedent to resolve interpretative differences and define the law. Conse-
quently, international law doctrines can vary more widely than doctrines in 
domestic and municipal systems.
16
Yet for the parties to recognize legal certainty, predictability, and con-
sistency in respect of international law, there must be a relatively coherent 
system of principles within which their legal claims are exercised and upon 
which adjudicative powers are exercised. How has it come to pass that the 
international courts are not, in any sense, ruling in common and creating a 
body of law that they can jointly rely on to adjudicate disputes—even in 
parts of the globe that have long traveled under the sign of international 
law? What mixture of modern phenomena has eviscerated the substance of 
jurisdictional collisions?
First, it is possible to identify a growing number of applications, that 
while relating to the same dispute, are submitted to more than one interna-
tional tribunal—by the same claimant. “Forum shopping” by “rational 
claimants” is at least partly to blame.
17
The practice consists of the accumu-
lation of international proceedings with the same fact pattern and essentially 
the same parties to give one’s legal claims a greater chance of success.
18
For 
example, claimants will sometimes pursue the same case through commer-
cial arbitration and investment arbitration;
19
or they will persevere through 
setbacks exhausting the same legal instruments.
20
But claimant rationality is 
15. See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 11.
16. See generally Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribu-
nals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271 (2003).
17. Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement 
in International Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. 735, 735–61 (2007) (“[T]he complaint’s choice of fo-
rum is not simply a function of which institution is likely to come the closest to its ideal ruling 
against the defendant, but where the resulting precedent will be more useful . . .”).
18. Id.
19. For example, in 2018, Spanish construction group Sacyr filed multiple investment 
treaty claims against the Republic of Panama in a dispute over the expansion of the Panama 
Canal that previously triggered a series of arbitrations pursuant to International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) Rules. See GLOBAL ARB. REV., Panama Faces Treaty Claim Over Canal 
Works (Sept. 10, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1173975/panama-faces-
treaty-claim-over-canal-works.
20. On the same facts, two new ICC proceedings were commenced by the same claim-
ant, Sacyr, against the Panama Canal Authority, while three other previously filed claims were 
underway. GLOBAL ARB. REV., Two More ICC Claims Over Panama Canal (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1080002/two-more-icc-claims-over-panama-canal.
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not the only force responsible for breeding jurisdictional collisions in inter-
national law.
Second, the regionalization agendas of regional courts (and their juridi-
fied regional unions) are also crucial to the trend of jurisdictional collisions. 
After several decades of operation, regional courts have become a guiding 
force in the integration of nation states into regional organizations. These 
courts—the ECJ, the ECtHR, the ICtHR, and others—displace the basic 
principles of unity and universality of international law with regional crite-
ria that seek to bind the relationships and rights of proximate states more 
closely together.
21
They render every judgment on the model of the treaty or 
charter which created them, not on the basis of the body of international law 
as a whole; hence while their member states benefit, the rest of the world 
does not.
22
As a result, the justice system of international law is largely de-
centralized,
23
and the role of regional unions and their adjacent courts has 
moved from advisory to effectively usurping the classic adjudication of in-
ternational law by entirely international courts.
24
For as long as this situation 
continues, the uniform adjudication of international law will remain a con-
tinuous aspirational project, perpetually unfinished as decisions come to 
dominate in each field and region, making a sharp break with each other.
25
As a solution to the disintegration of international legal regimes,
26
many 
commentators have considered whether identifying a single court with ex-
clusive jurisdiction to decide on the meaning of an international norm could 
21. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The 
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (2000).
22. Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication 48 (John M. 
Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 206, 2004).
23. See GERHARD VON GLAHN & JAMES TAULBEE, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (11th ed. 2017); see also Myres McDougal 
& William Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives Versus National 
Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539, 568 (1958).
24. That is, non-regional international courts. See Yuval Shany, THE COMPETING 
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003).
25. This lack of uniformity is reflected in the way some courts simultaneously can re-
quire each of their members to follow their precedent—but can only require their members to 
do so. For example, decisions from the ECJ and the ECtHR govern the doctrines of interna-
tional law in Europe, though they don’t reach sovereigns and private citizens outside the re-
gion; the findings of the ICtHR, the ICC, or even the ITLOS also apply only to their state par-
ties. When international courts interpret and apply the same legal instruments with opposing 
views, they risk fragmented understandings of the same principles. For a similar conclusion 
on the structure of international law, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Re-
gime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1000–01 (2004).
26. In a time when scholarly theories on the multiplicity of international courts abound, 
many of them have in common a general worry of the fragmentation: That the variety of re-
sponses to interchangeable legal disputes could fracture the uniform application of interna-
tional legal rules in different sectors and regions. Writings that recall these worries include: 
Hafner, supra note 12; Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 1; and Pauwelyn, supra note 1.
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be the most effective method to ensure its uniform interpretation.
27
This is 
the approach most explicitly followed by the ECJ, in the context of Europe-
an law, to protect its jurisdiction against other courts.
28
Accordingly, EU 
Member States involved in any international dispute that potentially raises 
issues of Community law must bring the case before the ECJ and not anoth-
er settlement body.
29
However, as will be discussed below, the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the ECJ is problematic as it limits parties’ rights to use other 
dispute settlement systems.
30
Ultimately, to be meaningful, jurisdiction must reach further into the 
fabrics of each international law field and geographic region than it ever 
has.
31
It must give freedom to the parties to consider all their options to set-
tle a dispute while, at the same time, avoiding unjustified, duplicative ac-
tions. And it must fully safeguard the underlying diversity of regionalism, 
while preserving its “universality.”
32
It is submitted here that, contrary to the conclusions of prior commenta-
tors, allowing courts to claim exclusive jurisdiction without requiring intra-
court dialogue may jeopardize the future development of the international 
legal order and fail to keep the law up to date with social changes across re-
gions. Given these risks, the determination of proper jurisdiction over legal 
disputes should be analyzed in light of a number of variables, including the 
importance and urgency of the rights at stake to the relevant community, the 
degree to which each court can provide meaningful remedies, and whether 
the legal claims either have been previously decided or are being simultane-
ously heard at another court. Under this approach, tribunals recognize each 
other’s strengths. They neither transform nor curtail the interests of the par-
ties but refer them to the forum best suited to redress their legal rights. At 
the same time, a tribunal that receives a dispute—relating to the same inci-
dent and substantive law—which has been resolved elsewhere would be jus-
tified to dismiss the case.
27. See Nikolaos Lavranos, Protecting Its Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Mox Plant-
Judgment of the ECJ, 5 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 479 (2006); Nikolaos Lavranos, 
Concurrence of Jurisdiction Between the ECJ and Other International Courts and Tribunals,
EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 213 (2005).
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See Lavranos, Protecting Its Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Mox Plant-Judgment of 
the ECJ, supra note 27.
30. Part III is dedicated to the precise analysis of this question.
31. Hafner, supra note 12, at 859 (recalling that fragmentation can also reflect a posi-
tive specialization of international regulations and lead to better representation of the needs of 
individual states).
32. G. Hafner, Risks Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International Law, Int’l L. 
Comm’n, Report of the Working Group on Long-Term Programme of Work, at 35, ILC 
(LII)/WG/LT/L.1/Add. 1 (July 25, 2000) (noting that “the tendency of regionalism even in 
respect of areas, such as human rights, where universal values would appear to be at stake, 
raises significant tensions for international law”).
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The following analysis is influenced by the large body of case law and 
legal literature on jurisdiction collisions in the law of the sea. It is now con-
ventional wisdom that this field is particularly susceptible to the phenome-
non.
33
This tendency can be ascribed to the growing number of law of the 
sea adjudicating bodies and litigants since the entry into force of the United 
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS,” the “Convention,” 
or the “Law of the Sea Treaty”) thirty-eight years ago.
34
Collisions also arise 
out of the jurisdictional competition between the procedures of the Conven-
tion and regional international courts. As a result, in many instances, there 
are parallel proceedings in different fora between the same or closely related 
parties regarding largely identical issues, including in the European legal 
system. This note evaluates the effects of jurisdiction collisions in contrast 
with the dangers of exclusive jurisdiction. My approach aims to redress the 
imbalance between the two sides.
Part II provides an example of how jurisdiction collisions might occur 
in international law by surveying the various mechanisms for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes adopted in the field of law of the sea. Part III explores 
how the European Court of Justice has invoked exclusive jurisdiction over 
disputes between EU Member States, even when the states themselves have 
reserved other litigation options. Part IV then suggests how tribunals may 
better capture the positive benefits of jurisdiction collisions without sacrific-
ing a coherent body of law. In short, tribunals should assess their jurisdic-
tion based on urgent party needs, available remedies, and the existence of 
contemporaneous disputes elsewhere. I conclude with a few observations 
about the implications of this approach for the relationship between interna-
tional courts.
II. Law of the Sea as a Case Study: The Potential for 
Competing, Contemporaneous Proceedings
While a few maritime conflicts are regrettably still settled by armed 
conflict, states now resolve most maritime disputes through a wide range of 
peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms.
35
Since the introduction of 
UNCLOS, which is deeply influenced by customary principles of interna-
tional law,
36
the sector has experienced a fundamental change of character.
37
33. It is appropriate to observe at the outset that the law of the sea is an essential part of 
international law and any dispute concerning the application and interpretation of that law 
should be seen as subject to settlement by international bodies. For an overview of the rela-
tionship between law of the sea and international law, see generally C. J. COLOMBOS &
ALEXANDER PEARCE HIGGINS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (6th ed. 1967).
34. I elaborate on these points in Part II below.
35. See Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
189, 193 (1998).
36. For an overview of UNCLOS’s customary law inspiration, see JAMES SEBENIUS,
NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 91 (1984); Martin Lee, The Interrelation Between the 
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The Convention provides a comprehensive code governing the sea: It fea-
tures over 400 legal provisions and is the text of reference for international 
lawyers, government officials, and litigants seeking to understand legal is-
sues related to the sea or maritime boundaries.
38
As such, it merits the title 
the “Constitution for the Oceans.”
39
At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
40
held 
in New York in 1980, a proposal for a general system of law of the sea dis-
pute settlement—to include a wide range of modalities from informal, non-
binding procedures to formal procedures entailing binding decisions
41
—was 
introduced as the “Montreux Formula.”
42
As codified in article 287(1) of the 
Law of the Sea Treaty, under the Montreux Formula states may choose to 
refer their legal disputes to: (i) the newly-instituted ITLOS;
43
(ii) the ICJ; 
(iii) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; and (iv) 
an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for disputes 
concerning special categories.
44
This multifaceted approach to the litigation 
of law of the sea disputes was probably the most important reason for the 
Convention’s successful adoption.
45
At the same time, UNCLOS’s multi-
Law of the Sea Convention and Customary International Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 405, 
409 (2006). 
37. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 36.
38. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [herein-
after UNCLOS]. 
39. See Tommy Koh, President, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, Address to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: A Constitution 
for the Oceans (Dec. 11, 1982).
40. On 1 November 1967, Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta addressed the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and called for “an effective international regime over the sea-
bed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction.” This led to the con-
vening, in 1973, of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which after 
nine years of negotiations successfully drafted the Convention. See 1 R. P. ANAND, LEGAL 
REGIME OF THE SEA-BED AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 182 (1977). 
41. A. O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A DRAFTING HISTORY AND A 
COMMENTARY 7 (1987). 
42. See A. O. Adede, The Basic Structure of the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of 
the Sea Convention, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 125, 131 (1982).
43. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent judicial body 
established by UNCLOS to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Convention. Additionally, pursuant to article 21 of the Tribunal’s Statute, the 
ITLOS is also open to disputes arising out of any other agreements which confer jurisdiction 
on it other than UNCLOS. The Tribunal is composed of twenty-one elected judges, distributed 
among several chambers. 
44. See UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 287(1).
45. On the importance of making the dispute settlement system an integral part of 
UNCLOS, see Louis Sohn, Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes, 10 INT’L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 205 (1995). To this date, UNCLOS has been ratified by 168 parties, including 
167 States and the European Union. See UNITED NATIONS, Status of Treaties: United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=
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forum approach contributes to the proliferation of international tribunals and 
adds to the potential for fragmentation—both of substantive law and of the 
procedures available for settling disputes.
46
Indeed, Professor Alan Boyle argued that the multiplicity of forums for 
the settlement of disputes under UNCLOS would result in both actual frag-
mentation, because there is no single forum covering all disputes arising un-
der the Convention, and potential fragmentation, because there is no mecha-
nism for ensuring uniformity in the outcome of similar or identical cases 
before different tribunals.
47
Yet, strikingly, the jurisprudence on the law of the sea following the 
adoption of UNCLOS is characterized by continuity rather than discord.
48
As mentioned in the introduction, a more recent cause for concern about 
fragmentation in the development of the law of the sea is not related to the 
structure of the UNCLOS dispute settlement system at all: Rather, as re-
gions are becoming poles for the development of international law, they are 
interfering in the exercise of jurisdiction by other international courts and 
tribunals.
49
Given its already fragmented system, this is profoundly concern-
ing in the field of law of the sea.
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 17, 
2020).
46. Alan Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of 
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 37 (1997).
47. Id. at 40.
48. Jonathan Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement 
Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (1996). For an 
overview of the consistency maintained between the ICJ and the ITLOS over the merits of 
cases dealing principally with the law of the sea, see ICJ caselaw: North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Ger. v. Den. & Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. 
v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175 (July 25); Continental Shelf Case (Tunis. v. Libya),
Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Continental Shelf (Libya v. 
Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Sal. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 11); Maritime Delimitation in the Area be-
tween Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14). See also 
ITLOS caselaw: Beagle Channel Arbitration (Arg. v. Chile), 52 I.L.R. 93 (Feb. 18, 1977); 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration, 54 I.L.R. 11 (Mar. 14, 1978); Sharjah/Dubai 
Boundary Arbitration, 91 I.L.R. 543 (Oct. 19. 1981); Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime 
Boundary Arbitration 25 I.L.M. 252 (Feb. 14, 1985): Franco-Canadian Fisheries Arbitration 
XIX R.I.A.A. 225 (July 17, 1986); Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Maritime Delimitation 83 I.L.R. 1 
(Nov. 12, 1991); St Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration (Can. v. Fr.) 95 I.L.R. 645 (June 10, 
1992). 
49. As will be discussed in Part III, some regional international courts, such as the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, have consistently defined the scope of their jurisdiction vis-à-vis oth-
er international courts. In this sense, since the early 2000s, the ECJ has restricted the sover-
eign right of the Member States to select the dispute settlement system of their choice and 
prevents certain disputes from being brought before external courts. See Mox Plant Case (Ir. 
v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Nov. 13, 2001, ITLOS Rep. 2001, https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/published/C10-O-13_nov_01.pdf. The official 
date of the commencement of these proceedings was October 5th, 2001. 
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A. Multiplicity of Fora for Law of the Sea Disputes
UNCLOS is uniquely suited to be a case study for the benefits and 
shortcomings of jurisdiction collisions because of its range of possible fo-
rums for compulsory settlement. UNCLOS establishes four methods by 
which parties can settle their disputes,
50
and it permits parties to invoke 
more than one method at a time.
First, the Convention provides extensive support for maintaining the 
ICJ’s prevalent position as an adjudicator of law of the sea cases involving 
state actors.
51
Indeed, at the time of drafting the Convention, the only inter-
national court with sufficient experience on law of the sea to assist the Con-
tracting Parties was the ICJ.
52
However, because non-state disputants may 
not submit their controversies to the ICJ, it was an unsuitable forum for het-
erogenous maritime disputes and the variety of actors they involve.
53
Given
that the Convention was intended to cover non-state actors,
54
there was a 
need to establish a forum with broader jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes 
between those actors or between those actors and states. As a result, a new 
international tribunal, the ITLOS, was born.
55
What a single court used to 
do, two began to do instead.
50. UNCLOS article 287, entitled “Choice of procedure,” provides:
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereaf-
ter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or 
more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the in-
terpretation or application of this Convention:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accord-
ance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for 
one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
Additionally, as discussed below, parties may designate another judicial system under 
UNCLOS article 282.
51. For example, UNCLOS article 74 upholds the importance of the ICJ’s role in the 
delimitation of exclusive economic zones between States. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 74 
(“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solu-
tion.”); see also Charney, supra note 48.
52. See Helmut Tuerk, UNCLOS and the Contributions of ITLOS, in UN CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 15 (Shicun Wu et al. eds., 2015). 
53. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the 
Court.”); see also Fergus Green, Fragmentation in Two Dimensions: The ICJ’s Flawed Ap-
proach to Non-State Actors and International Legal Personality, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 47, 54 
(2008); Yael Ronen, Participation of Non-State Actors in ICJ Proceedings, 11 L. & PRAC.
INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 77 (2012).
54. See Boyle, supra note 46, at 37–38.
55. UNCLOS, supra note 38, annex VI, art. 1 (“The International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea is constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
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UNCLOS empowered more than the ICJ and the ITLOS to settle law of 
the sea disputes. Arbitral tribunals were also designated as potential adjudi-
cators.
56
Under Annexes VII and VIII, parties can trigger the constitution of 
a special arbitral tribunal to resolve their dispute,
57
and arbitration is the de-
fault style of dispute resolution for parties who have not agreed to another 
dispute resolution option.
58
UNCLOS arbitral tribunals exist only temporarily and outside the juris-
diction of any state’s judiciary or any other international court.
59
The tribu-
nals independently apply the relevant law to the subject-matter of the dis-
pute, even without consulting states whose laws might be implicated.
Additionally, through article 282 of the Convention, states may desig-
nate another dispute settlement mechanism of their choice—not included in 
the Convention—as the default system to resolve legal disputes in which 
they are involved.
60
Thus, parties are able to designate a regional interna-
tional court as the preferred forum to resolve all of their law of the sea cas-
es, even prevailing over the Convention’s designated mechanisms. One state 
has even done so: Greece made a special declaration expressing in detail 
those Convention issues for which it wished to transfer jurisdiction to the 
ECJ.
61
tion and this Statute.”); see also Helmut Tuerk, UNCLOS and the Contributions of ITLOS, in
UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 31–46 (2016).
56. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 287(1)(c); see also Louis Sohn, The Role of Arbitra-
tion in Recent International Multilateral Treaties, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 171, 185 (1982).
57. See UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 287(5), annex VII, VIII.
58. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 287(1)(4) (“If the parties to a dispute have not ac-
cepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbi-
tration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.”).
59. Id. annex VII, arts. 5, 10 (“[T]he arbitral tribunal shall determine its own proce-
dure . . . . The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject-matter of the dis-
pute and state the reasons on which it is based.”). Broadly speaking, another salient feature of 
arbitral tribunals—including UNCLOS arbitral tribunals—is that they are not permanent insti-
tutions but have to be constituted for every case. In this respect, arbitral tribunals then disband 
when the specific dispute is resolved and their given legal status expires. LEW ET AL., 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 224 (2003) (noting that, unlike 
state courts, arbitral tribunals are not permanent, and their mission is to hear a single case).
60. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 282 (“If the States Parties which are parties to a dis-
pute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed, through a 
general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of 
any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that pro-
cedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the 
dispute otherwise agree.”).
61. In ratifying the UNCLOS, Greece conferred the European Court of Justice with 
jurisdiction over certain issues relating to the Convention, rather than accepting any of the 
procedures provided for in article 287(1). This is a legally binding declaration which Greece 
made pursuant to article 282 of UNCLOS. Consequently, Greece could effectively direct dis-
putes arising out of the Convention to the ECJ as long as its counter-party has also made a 
declaration to that effect. By doing so, Greece and the other party would have successfully 
brought their dispute before an adjudicative body other than those established by UNCLOS. 
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The Convention permits litigants to use either arbitral tribunals or the 
aforementioned judicial systems to solve their disputes, alternatively or even 
simultaneously.
62
Thus, counsel to law of the sea disputes must decide 
whether file a suit with the ICJ, the ITLOS, or an arbitral tribunal, or some 
combination of those, or all of them. The prevailing wisdom is that filing in 
multiple fora increases one’s chances of success, as some dispute settlement 
procedures may be more favorable to one of the litigants.
63
It is worth reiter-
See UNITED NATIONS, Status of Treaties: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—
Declarations and Reservations, Greece—Upon Ratification, ¶ 4, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=
_en (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (“Greece, as a State member of the European Union, has given 
the latter jurisdiction with respect to certain issues relating to the Convention. Following the 
deposit by the European Union of its instrument of formal confirmation, Greece will make a 
special declaration specifying in detail the issues dealt with in the Convention for which it has 
transferred jurisdiction to the European Union.”).
62. In the absence of an express prohibition in the Convention and given the desire for 
flexibility in its interpretation, I infer that parties can initiate an unlimited number of proceed-
ings in respect of the same dispute, pursuant to article 287. Indeed, the parties are free to have 
recourse to any forum and any number of procedures they choose, judicial or arbitral; not-
withstanding that the respective tribunals could decide to stay or consolidate the proceedings 
from different venues. This issue is best illustrated in Part III through the Mox Plant cases, in 
which Ireland commenced three parallel proceedings against the United Kingdom over a sole 
dispute. The essential point is that no restrictions are in place on instituting legal proceedings 
at more than one forum at the same time. See Marianne P. Gartner, The Dispute Settlement 
Provisions of the Law of the Sea: Critiques and Alternatives of the Law of the Sea (1981–
1982), 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 582–83; see also infra note 65. Neither an implied nor an 
express limitation in this sense was included in the text of the Convention. Article 288 of the 
Convention, entitled “Jurisdiction,” reads in full:
1. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which 
is submitted to it in accordance with this Part.
2. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over 
any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international 
agreement related to the purposes of this Convention, which is submitted to it 
in accordance with the agreement.
3. The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea established in accordance with Annex VI, and any other chamber or arbi-
tral tribunal referred to in Part XI, section 5, shall have jurisdiction in any 
matter which is submitted to it in accordance therewith.
4. In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the 
matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.
UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 288.
63. Whatever the specific reason, the goal of selecting one particular court or jurisdic-
tion over another is always the same: To gain a perceived or actual advantage in litigation 
through reduced costs, improved remedies, or more favorable laws or procedural rules. The 
forum most favorable to the party’s case, however, is not always the forum that is most con-
nected to the dispute. For this reason, a party may choose to file with all the courts with poten-
tial jurisdiction over the litigation with the hope that its suit will survive objections from the 
counter-party in at least one of the forums. See also Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Salles, Forum 
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ating that nothing in the Convention prevents any of the judicial systems 
from issuing decisions that oppose each other (in outcome or in basic inter-
pretation of the underlying law), even when they are hearing a case simulta-
neously.
B. Multiplicity of Participants in Law of the Sea Disputes
A multiplicity of forums is not the only factor that produces complexity 
in law of the sea cases. An observer cannot fail to note the large number of 
actors typically involved. As mentioned earlier, the UNCLOS’s drafters 
broadened the range of parties who may be involved in international litiga-
tion arising from the Convention. Perhaps this could be seen as a promotion
of inclusiveness, seeking to ensure that all the relevant parties to a dispute 
have recourse to legal adjudication under one of the procedures of article 
287(1).
64
Yet this expansion of potential parties also expands the number of 
potential simultaneous claimants, and because the Convention does not limit 
the parties’ ability to file claims to a single forum,
65
recurrent collisions 
among proceedings instituted by one party or another at different court 
houses or tribunals seem likely.
As Sir Robert Jennings rightly stated, the ICJ’s narrow rationae perso-
nae jurisdiction reflects a conception of participation in the international le-
gal system conceived after World War II and out of step with contemporary 
international society.
66
Other international tribunals, including those tasked 
Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77 (2009).
64. See Charney, supra note 48 at 73–74 (“We should celebrate the increased number 
of forums for third-party dispute settlement found in the [UNCLOS] . . . it means that interna-
tional third-party settlement procedures, especially adjudication and arbitration, are becoming 
more acceptable. This development will promote the evolution of public international law and 
its broader acceptance by the public as a true system of law”).
65. It should be clarified that various scholars have interpreted article 287(4) of 
UNCLOS as an electa una via clause that prohibits recourse to any other settlement forum 
when the parties have already referred their dispute to one. In situations like under UNCLOS 
where parties may have recourse to more than one dispute settlement forum, this type of 
clause prohibits parties who have elected a particular forum from choosing another. Ishaya 
Paul Amaza, Multiplicity of International Dispute Settlement Forums: Avoiding the Risk of 
Parallel Proceedings, 6 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 149, 158 (2012). This provision, however, does 
not prevent parties from filing multiple claims with different UNCLOS settlement bodies, but 
rather serves as a basis for international tribunals to stay or consolidate the proceedings from 
different venues. The issue then remains that, with frequent litigants, a viable option to expand 
their chances of success is to bring the dispute to all plausible forums. Thus, the risk of juris-
diction collisions will remain a feature of the UNCLOS dispute settlement system. Gartner, 
supra note 68, at 582–83.
66. See Robert Jennings, The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 493, 504 (1995).
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or even European Union law,
69
have adopted broader rules 
on participation by private parties and international organizations.
70
Like-
wise, the ITLOS needed to be open to a wide range of parties, including in-
ternational organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other enti-
ties which are not states or whose international status is not recognized by 
other states, such as Taiwan or Palestine.
71
The procedures provided for by the Law of the Sea Treaty in its Part 
XV are generally open only to “States Parties,” as provided in article 291,
72
but it should be noted that the term “States Parties,” as used throughout the 
Convention, is extended by article 2(1)(2):
73
In addition to states, the Con-
vention is consequently open to self-governing associations of states and 
territories entitled to participate in the Convention under article 305
74
and to 
67. European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms art. 25, Apr. 11, 1950, 
E.T.S. No. 5; American Convention on Human Rights art. 44, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123. 
68. See WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN YEARS,
1981–1991 29–32 (1993); Boyle, supra note 46, at 51–52; David D. Caron, The Nature of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Reso-
lution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104 (1990); John Crook, The UN Claims Commission—A New 
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 144 (1993). 
69. See Damien Gerard, Non-State Actors in European Law: Enhanced Participation of 
Non-State Actors in EU Law-Making and Law-Enforcement Process—A Quest for Legitimacy,
in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 407–11 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 
2011).
70. See generally KIEL WALTHER-SCHIICKING-INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rainer Hofmann & Nils 
Geissler eds., 1999) (providing an overview of the expansion of ratione personae jurisdiction 
of international tribunals).
71. See Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Individuals and Non-State Entities Before Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 58 (J.A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum 
eds., 2001) (arguing that the expansion of jurisdiction to non-state actors through ITLOS has 
had a positive effect on the interpretation of the Convention, as it has been advanced by dis-
putes brought by private parties and contractors and international organizations).
72. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 291 (“1. All the dispute settlement procedures speci-
fied in this Part shall be open to States Parties; 2. The dispute settlement procedures specified 
in this Part shall be open to entities other than States Parties only as specifically provided for 
in this Convention.”).
73. Id. art. 2(1) (“(1) “States Parties” means States which have consented to be bound 
by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force. (2) This Convention applies mu-
tatis mutandis to the entities referred to in article 305, paragraph 1(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), 
which become Parties to this Convention in accordance with the conditions relevant to each, 
and to that extent ‘States Parties’ refers to those entities.”).
74. Article 305 reads, in part:
This Convention shall be open for signature by: . . .
(c) all self-governing associated States which have chosen that status in an 
act of self-determination supervised and approved by the United Nations 
in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and which 
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certain international organizations under Annex IX—principally the Euro-
pean Union.
75
All of these entities are entitled to be parties to proceedings 
before the ITLOS, or to arbitration in accordance to the aforementioned ar-
ticle 287(1) of the Convention. For the EU this is a particularly significant 
characteristic, since Member States can also participate in disputes where 
their conduct is complained-of, within the terms of the Convention. Though 
unlikely, this results in the possibility that EU institutions and EU Member 
States could litigate against each other at UNCLOS dispute settlement bod-
ies.
Moreover, article 20(2) of Annex VI, establishing ITLOS, provides 
that:
The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in 
any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted 
pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tri-
bunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case.
76
Unlike article 291, this provision does not limit access only to State Par-
ties.
77
Nor, when used in article 20 of the Annex, is the term “entity” defined 
only by reference to state actors listed in article 187 of Part XI,
78
as it is 
have competence over the matters governed by this Convention, includ-
ing the competence to enter into treaties in respect of those matters; 
(d) all self-governing associated States which, in accordance with their re-
spective instruments of association, have competence over the matters 
governed by this Convention, including the competence to enter into 
treaties in respect of those matters; all territories which enjoy full internal 
self-government, recognized as such by the United Nations, but have not 
attained full independence in accordance with General Assembly resolu-
tion 1514 (XV) and which have competence over the matters governed 
by this Convention, including the competence to enter into treaties in re-
spect of those matters . . . .
UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 305.
75. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 305(f) (listing as possible Convention signatories “in-
ternational organizations, in accordance with Annex IX”); id., annex IX, art. 1 (“For the pur-
poses of article 305 and of this Annex, ‘international organization’ means an intergovernmen-
tal organization constituted by States to which its member States have transferred competence 
over matters governed by this Convention, including the competence to enter into treaties in 
respect of those matters.”); id., annex IX, art. 2 (“An international organization may sign this 
Convention if a majority of its member States are signatories of this Convention.”); id., annex 
IX, art. 4 (discussing the extent of participation by and obligations for international organiza-
tions). The European Union is the only international organization that is a Convention party to 
UNCLOS to date. DEPOSITARY, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (list of signatories 
with their declarations and reservations) (last visited May 19, 2020).
76. Id., annex VI, art. 20(2).
77. Boyle, supra note 46, at 53. 
78. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 187; Boyle, supra note 46, at 53.
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when used in article 37 of the Annex.
79
Article 20(2) uses the word 
“agreement” without further qualification, suggesting not only that the 
agreement in question need not be a treaty, but also that the parties to it do 
not need to have the independent capacity to conclude treaties, allowing ju-
risdiction over non-states.
80
This provision enables actors to resolve their disputes before an interna-
tional tribunal without having to resolve the question of their legal status,
81
as do the arbitration provisions in Annexes VII and VIII.
82
However, by ex-
panding the pool of potential claimants in a law of the sea dispute, these 
provisions also make jurisdiction collisions more likely, since the same le-
gal dispute can be initiated by any of the various entities who could serve as 
claimants. And, since article 287(1) of UNCLOS does not preclude parties 
from instituting a multiplicity of proceedings, litigants can do so strategical-
ly in order to increase their chances of surviving objections to jurisdiction.
III. The European Court of Justice as a Case Study: 
How the European Union Framework Prevents Beneficial 
Jurisdiction Competition
International law progresses, in great part, through the legal argumenta-
tion that occurs in deliberation rooms. In the context of the divisive dynam-
ics of contemporary global affairs, it now also progresses through regional 
organizations trying to customize international rules for their own benefit. 
Regional conventions are increasingly taking the lead in enforcing norms 
originally rooted in international conventions,
83
giving rise to a system of 
scattered norms lacking a definite hierarchy.
79. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 37 (“The Chamber shall be open to the States Parties, 
the Authority and the other entities . . .”); Boyle, supra note 46, at 53 (supporting that the 
Convention does not uphold a limited reading of “entities”).
80. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 20(2) (“The Tribunal shall be open to entities other 
than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pur-
suant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all 
the parties to that case.”).
81. Going back to examples like Palestine or Taiwan, this characteristic is desirable so 
that an international suit can proceed even when the other party has not previously recognized 
a party’s international legal status. See generally THOMAS GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF 
STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 55–56 (1999).
82. Even NGOs can be parties to international arbitration against states. For an example 
from outside of the law of the sea context, see Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), France-
New Zealand Arb. Trib., 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 82 I.L.R. 500 (1990). See also Christine Gray & 
Benedict Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State Arbitration Since 1945,
63 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97, 104 n.39 (1993).
83. Regional conventions that reflect the rules embodied in international conventions 
are the principal basis of enforcement by regional international courts. As an illustration, the 
European Court of Human Rights will cite the European Convention of Human Rights instead 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) or the 1951 Refugee 
Convention to secure the same rights. See C-411/10 and C- 493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State 
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Some regional organizations have gone as far as to wrest jurisdiction 
away from other potential international courts and tribunals. This is the case 
for the European Court of Justice, which, as analyzed below, announced to 
EU Member States that it is the only and final dispute settlement body to 
adjudicate all aspects of Community law, including aspects that are integral 
part of the Community legal order.
84
While regional international courts like the ECJ do not seek to delegit-
imize international law or international tribunals, one should ask whether 
there are consequences when they are given the opportunity to monopolize 
the future development of international norms. Though the exclusive juris-
diction of regional courts may help maintain the unity of regional laws, if 
every international and regional court adopted a similar strategy, it could in 
fact undermine the unity of the extensive frameworks of international law, 
which goes back more than 350 years.
85
In this context, this note argues that the ECJ’s efforts to protect its ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the face of the ongoing proliferation of international 
courts and tribunals deprives Member States of the benefits of arbitration
86
under Annexes VII and VIII of UNCLOS and has the potential to give rise 
to serious breaches of the international obligations acquired by the EU 
Member States and to further deepen the separation of international law into 
regional loci. It could ultimately affect the autonomy of the EU legal or-
der.
87
A. The European Union and International Courts: Understanding the 
ECJ’s “Exclusive Jurisdiction”
Before describing how the EU and ECJ interact with UNCLOS, it may 
be helpful to provide some predicate on the EU’s capacity to sue and be 
for the Home Department (U.K.) and M.E. and Others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner 
& Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Ir.), 2011 E.C.R. 00000, ¶¶ 62, 80, and 111 
(although the European Court notes that regulations on the treatment of asylum seekers com-
ply with the 1951 Refugee Convention, the judgment relies on the fundamental rights set forth 
on the ECHR to decide the case; article 3 ECHR in specific). I leave aside whether this reality 
is a consequence of the lack of enforcement mechanisms attached to the primary international 
conventions. See generally Gabriel M. Wilner, Reflections on Regional Human Rights Law,
25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 407, 408 (1995).
84. See Comm’n v Ireland, Judgment, Case C-459/03, Comm’n of the European Com-
munities (May 5, 2006); BRUNO DE WITTE, DIRECT EFFECT, SUPREMACY AND NATURE OF 
THE LEGAL ORDER (Grainne de Burca & Paul P. Craig eds., 1999). 
85. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia was concluded. It is believed to be the seminal 
event in international law. For an account of the relevance of this event towards the establish-
ment of modern international law, see Benjamin Straumann, The Peace of Westphalia 1–2
(Inst. Int’l L. & Just., Working Paper No. 7, 2007).
86. Advantages such as the determination of the rules, language, and place of the pro-
cedure; the appointment of the final members of the tribunal; and, most importantly, confiden-
tiality. See generally STEPHEN E. BLYTHE, 47 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 273–90 (2013).
87. See infra Part III.C.
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sued in a variety of fora. To start, it is important to understand that the EU 
itself is created by treaties, and it can also produce new treaties.
88
After the 
European Union was founded, the Governments of Europe consented to 
transfer sufficient powers to the Union to enable it to manage matters relat-
ed to international law.
89
Under classic international law, only states enjoy 
unlimited legal personality and the capacity to sign, ratify, and voluntarily 
adhere to international treaties.
90
Consequently, in order for the EU to inher-
it those powers, its Member States had to grant them to the EU. To this end, 
through article 216 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) establishes the specific powers of the Union to join international 
agreements: The EU may join international agreements when the EU re-
ceives either an explicit treaty competence from its Member States, or, in 
the absence of an explicit treaty competence, it cites to binding EU law 
which nevertheless authorizes it to join.
91
In addition, the TFEU permits the 
Union to participate in international agreements when “necessary in order to 
achieve one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties . . . or [when such 
objective] is likely to affect the common rules or alter their scope.”
92
Any 
other international lawmaking by the EU is deemed ultra vires.93
Thus, the Union does not have unlimited ability to act in the interna-
tional order; it needs to be specifically empowered by the EU Member 
States to have a voice wherever the states desire it to. The scope of an em-
powerment may vary. For example, the Union’s authority in matters con-
cerning the law of the sea is significantly more generous than its supporting 
competence on the protection of human health.
94
The Union is not only able to participate in international lawmaking but 
in international litigation. The EU can be party to international lawsuits in 
two ways. First, European States have managed to create and maintain two 
regional international courts—the ECJ and the ECtHR—with extensive case 
88. See also Marco Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 443, 446 (2005). 
89. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Martti Kosken-
niemi ed., 1998) (aggregating a list of the European Union’s competencies in international 
law). 
90. See P. K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 95–96 (1992).
91. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
216, 2010 O.J.E.U. C 83 [hereinafter TFEU].
92. Id. The provision is, in reality, a codification of the ECJ’s decision in the ERTA 
case. See Case C-22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263. 
93. If the case arises, articles 263 and 267 of the TFEU establish the bases for initiating 
annulment proceedings. Ulas Gündüzler, United Nations Convention on Law of Sea as a 
Mixed Treaty of EU: A Headache for Turkey?, 12 ANKARA REV. EUR. STUD. 61, 66–67
(2013).
94. See TFEU, supra note 91, article 168(1); see also Wieke Willemijn Huizing Eding-
er, Food Health Law: A Legal Perspective on EU Competence to Regulate the ‘Healthiness’
of Food, 9 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 11 (2014).
2020] Jurisdiction Collisions in the Law of the Sea 671
law and highly complied-with judgments.
95
Agreements concluded by EU 
institutions become part of EU law, and the interpretation of their provisions 
necessarily falls within the jurisdiction of the ECJ;
96
and, with the upcoming 
accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), the EU institutions have agreed to the ECtHR’s supervision, 
too.
97
Moreover, the validity of an act executed by EU institutions in the in-
ternational sphere can be challenged at the ECJ in accordance with the 
TFEU.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is provided 
by article 344 of the TFEU, which states that:
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the in-
terpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settle-
ment other than [the European Court of Justice].
98
95. See Tobias Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship Between the 
Two European Courts, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L. CTS. & TRIBUNALS 375 (2009). 
96. TFEU, supra note 86, art. 216. Article 216 reads:
1.  The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or in-
ternational organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclu-
sion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of
the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is 
provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules 
or alter their scope.
2.  Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the 
Union and on its Member States. 
The ECJ has authority over “mixed agreements” like UNCLOS, too. A mixed agreement re-
fers to a treaty or agreement between the EU and a third party which touches both on compe-
tencies exclusive to the EU institutions and on competencies reserved to the EU member 
states, such that the obligations arising from the agreement are divided between EU and the 
Member States. As explained by Professor Koutrakos, mixed agreements are to be treated 
similarly to treaties concluded by the EU alone, which means that the Court’s jurisdiction ex-
tends prima facie to all parts of a mixed agreement except those that fall clearly within the 
exclusive competence of the Member States. See Panos Koutrakos, The Interpretation of 
Mixed Agreements Under the Preliminary Procedure, 7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 25, 36 
(2002). I elaborate on the nature of UNCLOS as a mixed agreement within the EU legal order 
in the next section.
97. On January 15, 2020, the EU and the Council of Europe approved the continuation 
of the ad hoc terms of reference to finalize the accession of the EU as a party to the ECHR, 
including its participation in the ECtHR. This negotiation process began in 2001, and forth-
coming meetings had to be rescheduled due to the COVID-19 crisis. Eur. Comm. Ministers, 
Ministers’ Deputies, Decision on Steering Committee for Human Rights, 1364th Mtg., Doc. 
No. CM/Del/Dec(2020)1364/4.3 (Jan. 15, 2020), https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_
details.aspx?objectid=09000016809979be. For additional background on the negotiation pro-
cess, see also Johan Callewaert, The Accession of the European Union to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2014).
98. TFEU, supra note 91, art. 344. Upon the creation of the European Court of Justice, 
only the six founding members of the ECC (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and West Germany) were subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. After the Treaty of 
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With the aim of ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of 
Community law, the ECJ hears cases involving Community law year-round, 
and it has the power to invalidate laws of the EU Member States that are 
found inconsistent with Community norms.
99
Thus, the ECJ serves as the 
final arbiter of the European Union’s legal order.
Second, though the ECJ has barred the EU Member States from enter-
ing international agreements to create new regional international courts that 
could overlap with its own jurisdiction and damage the homogeneity of EU 
law,
100
as a signatory of international agreements, the EU itself may be sued 
in external courts.
101
For instance, the European Union is a party to the En-
ergy Charter Treaty and numerous bilateral and multilateral investment trea-
ties that include investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions.
102
These provisions create the possibility of arbitral proceedings directed 
against the EU.
Maastricht entered into force in 1993, the European Union was formed and today counts 27 
Member States; all of them are covered by the jurisdiction of the European Court. It is the re-
sponsibility of the ECJ to ensure that the law of the Community is applied equally in all of 
them. See MARTIN DEDMAN, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1945–1995: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2006).
99. TFEU, supra note 91, art. 258.
100. In Opinion 1/09 on the Legality of a Unified Patent Litigation System, the ECJ re-
jected such a proposal because it would overlap with tasks already attributed to the national 
courts of EU Member States and the ECJ, thus risking the preservation of EU law. See Opin-
ion 1/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-01137 (Mar. 8). Additionally, in Opinion 1/91, the Court studied the 
establishment of a court for the European Economic Area (“EEA”). Opinion 1/91, 1991 
E.C.R. I-06079 (Dec. 14). Although from its start the EEA Court would have been bound by 
ECJ case law, the Court raised objections to the creation of such judicial body because the 
EEA Court’s decisions might usurp the ECJ in ruling on essentially the same issues, perhaps 
even in different ways. As a result, the EEA agreement never came into force. The ECJ did, 
however, rule in favor of a successor concept of the EEA Court, the European Free Trade As-
sociation (“EFTA”) Court which provided two important changes; the first being that such a 
court would only have jurisdiction within the framework of EFTA, and the other that the 
ECJ’s judgments would be compulsory on the EFTA Court. See Opinion 1/92, 1992 E.C.R. I-
02821, ¶¶ 13–14 (Apr. 10).
101. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 357–
58 (2009). When the EU is sued or sues, article 335 of the TFEU mandates the Union to be 
“represented by the [European] Commission.” TFEU, supra note 91, art. 335; Case C-73/14, 
Council v. Comm’n, Judgment, 2015/C, 2015 O.J. (398) 5, ¶ 58 (Oct. 6) (“It is clear from the 
case-law of the Court that article 335 TFEU, although restricted to Member States on its 
wording, is the expression of a general principle that the European Union has legal capacity 
and is to be represented, to that end, by the Commission.”). The Commission, in turn, is to be 
“represented by each of the institutions, by virtue of their administrative autonomy, in matters 
relating to their respective operation.” Id.
102. For a complete list of treaties with ISDS provisions to which the European Union is 
a party, see UNCTAD’s Work Programme on International Investment Agreements (IIAs), 
European Union (last visited June 8, 2020), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/groupings/28/eu-european-union-.
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On this issue, the ECJ has found that the EU’s submission of a dispute 
to an external judicial body does not automatically posit a conflict with 
Community law. The Judges noted:
Where an international agreement provides for its own system of 
courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between 
the Contracting Parties to the agreement and, as a result, to interpret 
its provisions, the decisions of that Court will be binding on the 
Community institutions, including the European Court of Justice. 
Those decisions will also be binding in the event that the Court . . .
is called upon to rule, by way of preliminary ruling or in a direct 
action, on the interpretation of the international agreement, insofar 
as that agreement is an integral part of the Community legal order. 
An international agreement providing for such a system of courts is 
in principle compatible with Community law.
103
Thus, the ECJ recognizes the capacity of European institutions to self-
defend against claims brought by other international actors or private par-
ties. Consequently, the European Union debuted in its first international suit 
in 2000, at the ITLOS.
104
B. The European Union, the EU Member States, and UNCLOS: Joint 
Liability Under the “Mixed Agreement” Theory
Historically, the greatest world powers have been those with access to 
the sea. Today, the majority of all rights and responsibilities of nations using 
the world’s oceans are officially regulated by UNCLOS. In the European 
context, the Union became a signatory of the Law of the Sea Treaty upon its 
completion in 1982—first as the European Economic Community, and then, 
when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, as the European Union.
105
As a Convention party, the Union regularly participates in UNCLOS-wide 
conferences along with its fellow EU Member States to decide on the im-
103. Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-06079, ¶¶ 39–40 (Dec. 14). 
104. Chile brought a case against the EU before an ad hoc Special Chamber of the Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea in relation to the exploitation of swordfish stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean. First, Chile requested a declaratory judgment on whether the EU had 
fulfilled its obligations under UNCLOS to ensure the conservation of highly migratory species 
and the living resources of the high seas. In counter, the EU claimed that the Chilean denial of 
port access to European ships violated substantive provisions of a trade agreement signed be-
tween the Parties. During January 2001, the EU and Chile finally reached an agreement that 
effectively suspended proceedings at the ITLOS. See Conservation and Sustainable Exploita-
tion of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur. Community), Case 
No. 7, Order of Dec. 20, 2000, ITLOS Rep. 148–51; see also Conservation and Sustainable 
Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur. Communi-
ty), Case No. 7, Order of Mar. 15, 2001, ITLOS Rep. 4, 5.
105. Council Directive 98/392 1998 O.J. (L 179) 1 (EC). 
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plementation of the Convention’s provisions.
106
Furthermore, the European 
Union has implemented specific provisions and regional cooperation plans 
(including enclosed and semi-enclosed seas and fisheries management) in-
spired by the text of the Convention.
107
As UNCLOS was originally being negotiated, the European Economic 
Community participated not as a prospective signatory, but as an observ-
er.
108
Other states feared that having both the EU Member States and the Eu-
ropean Union as parties would disturb the equilibrium of the Convention 
and amount to double representation for European states.
109
Despite these 
initial concerns, UNCLOS article 305(1)(f) ultimately allowed for the intro-
duction of international organizations as parties to the Convention.
110
The 
European Union is today a full party to the Convention.
For the purposes of understanding litigation surrounding UNCLOS, it is 
notable that the European institutions and the EU Member States concluded 
the Convention as a “mixed agreement.”
111
One of the most significant fea-
tures of mixed treaties is the division of implementation responsibility be-
tween the EU and its Member States, even as mixed agreements retain the 
same status in the Community legal order as agreements concluded by the 
EU alone.
112
As Professor Leal-Arcas explains, however, the exact alloca-
tion of responsibility within the Union requires a careful analysis of several 
factors, including whether subject-matters regulated by an agreement fall 
within the scope of the EU’s exclusive or shared competences and whether 
an obligation has been directly acquired by the EU institutions or the EU 
Member States.
113
As a consequences thereof, in respect of the EU Member States’ re-
sponsibility, a violation of an international agreement such as UNCLOS will 
amount not only to a breach of the agreement’s text, but also of their obliga-
tions under Community law.
114
Equally important, if EU institutions are 
found liable for breaching a mixed international agreement every EU Mem-
106. For an academic analysis of the EU’s participation in these conferences, see 
PUBLICATIONS ON OCEAN DEVELOPMENT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND ITS MEMBER STATES (Tullio Treves & Laura Pineschi eds., 1997). 
107. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2019/1241, 2019 O.J. (L 198) 105 (EU).
108. Esa Paasivirta, The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1045, 1047 (2015).
109. See Tullio Treves, The EEC and the Law of the Sea: How Close to One Voice?, 12 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 173, 184 (1983).
110. UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 305(1)(f) (“This Convention shall be open for signa-
ture by: . . . international organizations, in accordance with annex IX.”). As discussed above, 
“international organizations” was further defined in Annex IX, article 1.
111. See Council Directive 98/392 1998 O.J. (L 179) 1 (EC).
112. Lavranos, Protecting Its Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Mox Plant-Judgment of the 
ECJ, supra note 27, at 486.
113. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Community and Mixed Agreements, 6 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 483, 488–97 (2001).
114. Supra note 93.
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ber State will also be found liable. But if the EU institutions breach an in-
ternational agreement for which the institutions are exclusively competent, 
that breach will be interpreted as made directly by the Union without impli-
cating the states.
115
C. The ECJ’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Action: Restricting Jurisdiction 
Collisions in Disputes over the Law of the Sea and Beyond
Ultimately, despite the ECJ’s apparent openness to some external dis-
pute resolution by the EU as a whole and despite the mixed nature of the 
EU’s involvement in UNCLOS, which would appear to permit EU states, as 
independent signatories, to take advantage of the multitude of fora available 
for resolving law of the sea disputes, the ECJ has claimed hegemony over 
the resolution of law of the sea disputes arising between EU member states.
In Case C-459/03 Mox Plant, Commission v. Ireland (hereinafter, 
“MOX Plant”), the ECJ, invoking article 292 TFEU, explicitly determined 
the scope of its exclusive jurisdiction.
116
As part of a law of the sea dispute 
between Ireland and the United Kingdom, a total of four parallel judicial 
and arbitral processes were instituted. Ireland was concerned about the re-
lease of radioactive discharges at the Mox Plant (situated in Sellafield, Unit-
ed Kingdom) into the Irish Sea.
117
After its petitions to obtain information 
directly from the UK about the discharges were ignored, Ireland initiated 
arbitral proceedings against the UK at the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
under the OSPAR Convention.
118
Four months later, Ireland initiated anoth-
er proceeding before an ad hoc UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, also adminis-
tered by the PCA.
119
Two weeks after that, Ireland initiated a third proceed-
ing before the ITLOS requesting provisional measures.
120
Finally, on 
October 15, 2003, Ireland became a respondent when the European Com-
mission initiated a proceeding against the state at the ECJ.
121
The European Commission, supported by the UK, commenced an arti-
cle 258 TFEU (formerly article 226 TEC)
122
infringement procedure against 
Ireland for violating article 344 of the TFEU by submitting a dispute con-
115. Id. at 71.
116. See Case C-459/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, Judgment, 2006 E.C.R. 345.  
117. Id. ¶¶ 20–29. 
118. See Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.) 23 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003). The official date 
of commencement of these proceedings was June 15, 2001.
119. See Mox Plant Case, Order. 
120. See Mox Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Request for Provisional Measures 
(ITLOS, Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_
10/request_ireland_e.pdf.
121. See Case C-459/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, supra note 116. 
122. TFEU, supra note 91, art. 258 (“If the Commission considers that a Member State 
has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the 
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.”).
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cerning EU law to tribunals outside the EU legal order.
123
The ECJ ruled that 
by filing matters of EU law before external bodies, Ireland had violated the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.
124
In particular, the ECJ held that the EU 
Member States involved in a dispute that potentially raises issues of Com-
munity law are not allowed to bring the case before a dispute settlement 
body other than the ECJ.
125
Otherwise, in the ECJ’s view, the autonomy of 
the Community’s legal order might be adversely affected by rulings of other 
international courts or tribunals in disputes that also touch on EU law.
126
Co-
incidentally, this decision arrived at the same time as the oral hearings in the 
UNCLOS ad hoc arbitration.127 When the ECJ found Ireland in violation of 
European law, Ireland withdrew from the dispute before the arbitral tribu-
nals.
128
The case then came before the ECJ in full, even though both dispu-
tants originally intended to resolve their dispute in arbitration or before the 
ITLOS.
There are two striking aspects of this judgment. First, just as the ECJ 
claims its jurisdiction is exclusive, it also claims exclusive license to decide 
whether there exists an actual collision between the jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court and another dispute settlement body in the first instance.
129
Member States are not allowed to decide this themselves and therefore must 
submit all disputes that could involve EU law to the ECJ. Second, the ECJ’s 
approach to the primacy and exclusivity of its own jurisdiction is in direct 
contrast with the ITLOS’s approach. Unlike the ECJ, the ITLOS did not rule 
that it was the only available option to resolve the parties’ dispute. Rather, 
the ITLOS conceded that issues of Community law were involved in the 
case and therefore suspended the proceedings pending a final judgment 
from the European Court on those key issues covered by EU law.
130
Thus, 
while some tribunals like the ITLOS are embracing and cooperating with 
the multiplicity of other fora in the field, the MOX Plant case reveals that 
the ECJ is not among them.
123. See Case C-459/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, ¶¶ 124, 132, 154. 
124. Case C-459/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, ¶ 154 (“[T]he institution and pursuit of pro-
ceedings before the arbitral tribunal . . . involve a manifest risk that the jurisdictional order 
laid down in the Treaties [and], consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system 
may be adversely affected.”); see also id. ¶ 177 (“The act of submitting a dispute of this na-
ture to a judicial forum such as the Arbitral Tribunal involves the risk that a judicial forum 
other than the Court will rule on the scope of obligations imposed on the Member States pur-
suant to Community law.”).
125. Id. ¶ 136.
126. Id. ¶ 154.
127. See Mox Plant Case, Order.
128. Id.
129. Lavranos, Protecting Its Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Mox Plant-Judgment of the 
ECJ, supra note 27, at 489. 
130. Although ITLOS initially confirmed its prima facie jurisdiction, it found it neces-
sary to consider a potential collision with the jurisdiction of the ECJ. See Mox Plant Case, 
Order.
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MOX Plant is not the only case to demonstrate this point. In the 2018 
case Slovak Republic v. Achmea, the Court addressed the Slovak Republic’s 
objection to an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over a dispute between EU 
Member States (the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic) pursuant to the 
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT, which was signed before the Slovak Republic 
joined the EU.
131
The bench noted that agreements between Member States 
containing arbitration clauses inappropriately
remove from the jurisdiction of their own courts, and hence from 
the system of judicial remedies which [EU law] requires them to 
establish in the fields covered by EU law, disputes which may con-
cern the application or interpretation of EU law.
132
Citing a line of cases arguing that the EU can solely comply with article 
19 TFEU through the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret Commu-
nity law in judicial dialogue with the national courts of the EU Member 
States as required by article 267 TFEU,
133
the ECJ held that, by denying the 
ECJ the opportunity to hear cases, the arbitration clause contained in the 
BIT risked the continuity of Community law, as protected by articles 344 
and 267 TFEU.
134 Achmea thus requires that arbitral tribunals reconsider the 
limits of their jurisdiction under intra-EU bilateral agreements.
135
131. See Case C 284/16, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, 
Judgment, 2018 E.C.R. 158.
132. Id. ¶ 55.
133. Id, ¶¶ 35–37.
134. TFEU, supra note 91, art. 344 (“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other 
than those provided for therein.”); id., art. 267 (“The Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the 
Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agen-
cies of the Union . . .”).
135. Achmea has already been interpreted and discussed by a number of arbitral tribu-
nals. To render viable, enforceable awards in the EU, they apparently prefer to ignore the de-
cision or exclude it from their interpretations, rather than attempting a reconciliation. Some 
arbitral awards that have effectively ruled that Achmea should not limit investment treaty 
agreements are: Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, 
Award (May 16, 2018) and UP and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/35, Award (Oct. 9, 2018). In contrast, the ruling in Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea Issue (Aug. 31, 2018) specifically rejected the 
application of Achmea, as the tribunal held that EU law is not part of general international law 
and therefore cannot constitute principles applicable between the parties that the tribunal 
would be called upon to interpret. In view of these decisions, one should expect Achmea to 
have very limited impact among the international community. 
However, the ECJ also recently decided a further question on the compatibility of anoth-
er EU investment agreements with EU law. See Opinion C-1/17, EU-Canada CET Agreement, 
2019 E.C.R. 72 (concluding, with a view of preserving the autonomy of the EU legal order, 
that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) Tribunal should be pre-
cluded from interpreting provisions of EU primary and secondary law).
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The reasoning in Mox Plant and Achmea has implications for the set-
tlement of law of the sea claims. Essentially, none of the wide variety of ad-
judicators permitted by the Convention could hear any UNCLOS dispute 
concerning issues of Community law, even when explicitly selected by the 
EU Member States. As mentioned earlier, article 282 of the Law of the Sea 
Treaty allows Convention parties to elect to submit disputes to any third-
party dispute settlement forum or to ITLOS or the ICJ, under article 
287(1).
136
If they desired to do so, all EU Member States could have appointed the 
ECJ to settle their intra-EU UNCLOS legal disputes under this provision. 
But only Greece has done so.
137
Instead, the ECJ has sought to surpass the 
Convention’s dispute settlement processes altogether by forcing EU coun-
tries to submit their disputes directly to the European Court. As a result, the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence unduly burdens the rights of EU Member States to refer 
legal disputes to alternative dispute settlement forums.
One could thus make the observation that dispute settlement processes 
relying on bodies external to the EU will only remain available to EU 
Member States for intra-EU disputes to the extent that: (i) international 
courts are willing to disregard the implications of their jurisdiction over dis-
putes between EU countries, therefore denying to stay the proceedings, or 
(ii) arbitrations are seated, and resulting awards enforced, outside the EU. 
Framed differently, the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court can on-
ly stand if other international tribunals and the national courts of the EU 
Member States do not resist its encroachment.
IV. Reconciling Jurisdiction Collisions
Though in my view jurisdiction collisions benefit international jurispru-
dence, the ECJ is correct that there is a need for clarity when a legal dispute 
can be brought before a multiplicity of forums. Currently, there is no bind-
ing legal obligation on an international court to yield jurisdiction in favor of 
another when there are at least two possible forums.
138
Below, I offer a pro-
posal for how an international tribunal can determine whether it is best suit-
ed to review a matter when multiple tribunals have jurisdiction. Drawing on 
the approaches taken by tribunals, practitioners, and academics to date, I 
identify three possible factors for tribunals to consider sequentially:
136. See UNCLOS, supra note 38, art. 282.
137. Of course, this transfer is only effective when the party facing Greece has also con-
ferred jurisdiction over the relevant issues to the ECJ. See Part II.A. 
138. See Inga Daukšienė, Recognition of Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union in International Courts, 19 JURISPRUDENCIJA 459 (2012).
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A. The Existence and Status of Proceedings Elsewhere
First, when an international court receives an application instituting 
proceedings over a dispute that is already being decided in another court, it 
should suspend proceedings until the first has arrived at a final decision.
139
We have seen how a failure to suspend proceedings creates a problematic 
context in the MOX Plant cases: The ECJ did not wait until other forums 
arrived at a decision; instead, it sanctioned Ireland while the other proceed-
ings were active. In contrast, tribunals not only focus on the unity of reme-
dies—one process, one judgment—but also minimize the risk of parallel 
proceedings instituted for the mere purpose of increasing litigants’ chances 
to survive jurisdictional objections, which are manifestly abusive.
The domestic concept of estoppel should play a powerful role here; lis 
pendens and res judicata each bar a second litigation whenever the “parties” 
and the “matter in dispute” in the two proceedings are substantially identi-
cal.
140
According to the ILA’s Recommendations, where parallel proceed-
ings have been commenced before one tribunal and are pending before an-
other, the later tribunal should decline jurisdiction or stay the current 
proceedings, “in whole or in part, and on such conditions as it sees fit, for 
such duration as it sees fit.”
141
As discussed below, there may be an excep-
tion when the relief available to the requesting parties in another tribunal 
would be inadequate. Contemporary jurisprudence
142
and legal commen-
139. W. Michael Reisman, Professor of International Law, Shabati Rosenne Memorial 
Lecture: Parallel Proceedings in International Law (Dec. 5, 2019).
140. See, e.g., Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) 
No. 11, at 30 (May 16). (stating that “the doctrine of res judicata [applies when] not only the 
Parties but also the matter in dispute [are] the same”); China Navigation Co. Ltd. (U.K.) v. 
U.S. (The Newchwang Case), 6 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 64, 65 (1921) (“It is a well-established 
rule of law that the doctrine of res judicata applies only where there is identity of the parties 
and of the question at issue.”). The requirements for lis pendens and res judicata are largely 
the same. See, e.g., Pedro Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, The Role of Precedent in 
Defining Res Judicata in Investor-State Arbitration, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 419, n.49
(2012) (“Though conceptually similar to res judicata, lis pendens applies when the [compet-
ing] proceedings are ongoing. Res judicata, in contrast, relates to the binding and preclusive 
effects of completed proceedings.”).
141. Filip De Ly & Audley Sheppard, ILA Recommendations on Lis Pendens and Res 
Judicata and Arbitration, 25 ARB. INT’L 83, Recommendation 5 (2009). In situations where a 
full decision has not been rendered on the merits (e.g., when the prior forum declined jurisdic-
tion, and the case was never heard at a merits phase), I am not suggesting that litigants should 
be barred from pursuing further litigation of their claims. Only decisions on the merits may 
become res judicata in a majority of domestic jurisdictions. See K.R. HANDLEY & SPENCER 
BOWER, RES JUDICATA (2009).
142
. See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. The Czech Republic, Legal Opinion Pre-
pared by Christoph Schreuer and August Reinisch, UNCITRAL Arb. Proceedings, ¶ 63 (June 
20, 2002) (“It has been recognized that if too restrictive criteria of identity with regard to the 
“object,” the “ground,” and “facts” of different cases are used, the doctrine of res judicata
would rarely apply. This has led international courts and tribunals to refrain from an overly 
formalistic approach vis-à-vis the question of the identity of issues.”).
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tary
143
make clear that these requirements must be interpreted flexibly, so as 
not to thwart justice in an international legal framework increasingly charac-
terized by overlapping jurisdictions. As Professor Reinisch notes:
[the] shared main purposes [of lis pendens and res judicata] of pre-
venting costly parallel litigation, avoiding conflicting judgements 
and protecting parties from oppressive litigation tactics will be 
achieved in a world of expanded dispute settlement opportunities 
only if the two principles are applied in a fashion transcending 
strict formalism. Instead of rigid identity tests, an overall assess-
ment of the parties involved, the legal grounds invoked, the objects 
pursued, and the underlying facts will be necessary in order to 
avoid a multiplication of proceedings with its inherent danger of 
conflicting outcomes.
144
Although respondents are often the most vocal opponents to duplicate 
litigation, in practice very few international suits are declared inadmissible 
on lis pendens and res judicata grounds. In connection with this proposal, 
an application must not merely aim to pursue a better outcome than a pre-
ceding international decision. Therefore, an application must not be substan-
tially the same as for a matter which has already been examined by a prior 
international court or has already been submitted to another procedure of 
international settlement, unless it contains relevant new information, or 
more suitable remedies in the case of human rights violations. What is of 
importance is that new facts be put forward in the litigation, or that the re-
questing party submits that the remedy available at the forum it is address-
ing now is more adequate in light of the factual nature of the case than the 
one it sought previously.
B. The Availability of Meaningful Remedies
Second, effective legal remedies can serve as expressions of the effica-
cy of international law itself.
145
Remedies send a signal to parties and other 
actors that treaty and norm violations will not go unnoticed—that interna-
tional agreements are not an empty promise, and international law is well 
equipped to deal with them. Enforceability should thus be a priority in tri-
bunals’ decisions on jurisdiction. The international court that receives a dis-
143
. See, e.g., Martinez-Fraga & Samra, supra note 140, at 433, 450; see also Vaughan 
Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals, 20 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 191, 202 
(stating that “[t]he doctrine [of lis pendens] indicates that if a substantially identical case is 
already pending before a competent tribunal, the forum may decline to exercise its own juris-
diction.”).
144. August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Proce-
dural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes, 3 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 37 (2004). 
145. See generally CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1990).
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pute for which it can offer no adequate remedies to the parties should im-
mediately identify other competing forums capable of providing them, and 
stay the proceedings. When possible, the court should point the parties to-
wards the relevant forum in view of the remedies they need.
For example, when the enforceability of a tribunal’s final award would 
not be not protected by the New York Convention, it should not accept ju-
risdiction over the dispute if the same dispute could also be brought before 
another body that could render an enforceable award, such as the ECJ or the 
ITLOS.
146
Similarly, when parties seek reparations from other states before 
UN organs, the ECJ should not be allowed to deny EU Member States ac-
cess to such forums—and most definitely not to the ICJ—when those fo-
rums are uniquely capable of providing enforceable decisions.
147
In cases in 
which multiple adjudicative bodies could provide effective remedies, it may 
be important to consider other factors before an international court declines 
or grants jurisdiction, including the particular international agreements 
which each party seeks to invoke; the type of outcome needed (e.g., the 
need for an international judgment instead of an arbitral award); the interest 
of the parties in confidential proceedings; and the geographical location of 
the parties or the place where the alleged acts occurred. These issues should 
then be addressed by the requesting party in its application to institute the 
proceedings.
C. The Importance and Urgency of the Rights at Stake
Third, in urgent cases, any tribunal that can offer adequate remedies 
should be allowed to retain jurisdiction—even if this means simultaneous 
proceedings and even if it undermines the continuity of another court’s ju-
risprudence. Accordingly, the international court that receives a dispute 
concerning the deprivation of essential treaty rights should proceed with the 
case, particularly when a request for provisional measures is attached. Re-
quests for provisional measures are very common in law of the sea dis-
putes.
148
146. If the states of which the parties are nationals have not ratified the New York Con-
vention (whose parties promise mutual enforceability of arbitral awards), the enforcement op-
portunities of an arbitral award will decrease enormously. Therefore, the ECJ or the ITLOS 
would be in better condition to provide a weightier remedy in this example.
147. For example, the ICJ can issue recommendations to the Security Council so that it 
takes action in the dispute before the Court. See Heidi K. Hubbard, Separation of Powers 
Within the United Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 165 (1985). Additionally, it can order the parties’ compliance with mechanisms estab-
lished by the United Nations, such as fact-finding missions. See Land and Maritime Boundary 
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13 (Mar. 15) (or-
dering parties to lend every assistance to the fact-finding mission which the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations had proposed for the case). 
148. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
LAW OF THE SEA (2004).
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But when the urgency of the dispute is not such that time prohibits the 
court from referring the dispute to a more fitting forum because of the risk 
of irreparable harm, the court should make such a referral. When evaluating 
the urgency of ongoing human rights violations, tribunals should weigh the 
reality of the gravity of the case and the adequacy of the remedy requested.
To offer a contemporary example, within days of The Gambia’s appli-
cation to institute ICJ proceedings against Myanmar,
149
the International 
Criminal Court launched an investigation into the prosecution of the Roh-
ingya.
150
A separate case was filed in Argentinean courts to prosecute inter-
national crimes committed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor of 
Myanmar, under the theory of universal jurisdiction.
151
This third element of 
jurisdiction determination would allow for all of these cases to proceed sim-
ultaneously, in as much as there is a pressing urgency that requires prompt 
action to protect the rights of the community. Yet in this example, in the ab-
sence of an ongoing human rights violation, the ICJ would have been 
deemed the best sole forum to which to direct this dispute, so that it could 
further develop its doctrine on genocide.
D. Questions of Competence-Competence
It might be questioned whether judges themselves should analyze the 
jurisprudence of other judicial venues in order to avoid contradiction of in-
ternational norms. This note argues that they should; such considerations 
enhance the predictability of international law, especially when the litigants 
in international disputes lack a shared vision of the overall structure of the 
jurisdiction of various international courts.
In sum, this proposal serves as an alternative to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of courts like the ECJ. If tribunals believe that other tribunals will co-
operate to refer each other appropriate cases, the fear that their own juris-
prudence will be undermined by those tribunals should decrease. Moreover, 
the consistency of international law should increase when tribunals’ deci-
sions are no longer driven by the kinds of collateral issues that influence 
courts of exclusive jurisdiction.
152
It is also possible that it could give tribu-
149. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indica-
tion of Provisional Measures, (Nov. 11, 2019, I.C.J.), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf.
150. Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an In-
vestigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar, ICC-01/19-27, Decision by Pre-Trial Chamber III (Nov. 14, 2019).
151. Agence France-Presse, Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi Faces First Legal Action 
Over Rohingya Crisis, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2019).
152. In this regard, the ICJ has reiterated its approach not to depart from settled jurispru-
dence unless there are reasons to do so, for example in the Cameroon v. Nigeria and Burkina 
Faso/Niger cases. See Cameroon v. Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 
292, ¶ 228 (June 11); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Niger), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J. 44 (Apr. 
16). 
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nals more knowledge about the ways in which their jurisprudence affects 
each other, both favorably or unfavorably, and how it affects the parties.
153
Moreover, if international courts demand exclusive jurisdiction, parties 
will lose recourse to the legal remedies available at other forums. To this 
end, this proposal focuses on the role of the courts to assess and guide the 
litigants to the forum that will be able to most effectively address their 
claims and requests. It does not purport to shut the doors of different institu-
tions by requiring parties to litigate in one region or place. Instead, it is 
aimed at getting the most meaningful remedies in the hands of the parties 
without the need to litigate at multiple courts. That a case is decided by the 
ECJ or the ITLOS should not matter as much as that the parties gain redress 
of their rights.
Will these new recommendations for international courts undercut ju-
risdiction collisions in view of a more predictable and coherent litigation 
framework? Compared to the current approach, the proposal seems like a 
significant improvement. Of course, tribunals adopting this approach will 
need to make adjustments, both to their jurisdictional rules and in determin-
ing when their jurisdiction does collide with that of another court. Tribunals 
should be capable of communicating with each other.
154
With regard to ju-
risdiction collisions, tribunals will be in new territory as they have not fo-
cused on defining their jurisdictional boundaries in view of other courts be-
fore. Yet some related tools, like stays of proceedings will already be 
familiar to them.
V. Conclusion
Forum shopping and consequent jurisdiction collisions are often con-
sidered to be a threat to the international legal system. Critics have argued 
that the ongoing proliferation of dispute settlement procedures could un-
dermine the unity of international law. For instance, the “Montreux Formu-
la” embodied in article 287 of UNCLOS provides a plurality of forums to 
which Parties can submit their disputes, including the ICJ, the ITLOS, and 
arbitral tribunals under Annexes VII and VIII. The potential for a colli-
sion—of jurisdiction and ultimately of jurisprudence—between these adju-
dicatory bodies and between these bodies and additional regional interna-
tional courts, such as the ECJ, easily gives rise to claims that the 
homogeneity of the international order will be diminished one incompatible 
153. I am assuming that a general commitment from tribunals to identify the jurisdiction 
and capabilities of other international courts will make them more knowledgeable about the 
ways in which different interpretations of a norm are more likely to be found incompatible 
with their own. 
154. This communication can take different forms, from establishing a system of pro-
tected channels for courts and tribunals to communicate to reuniting jurists from different 
courts in new international organizations or circles aimed at facilitating dialogue among them. 
In the context of the present proposal, I will express a preference for courts to focus primarily 
on cross-references in their decisions.
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judgment at a time. But there is no material evidence that suggests judicial 
decentralization has inhibited the coherence of any sector of international 
law.
Although we must proceed with caution, the growth in the number of 
international judicial institutions which can settle international disputes 
should be celebrated. It presents the opportunity to keep jurisprudence cur-
rent and embrace inter-judicial debates among the world’s greatest jurists on 
the various forms that a single norm can adopt. By contrast, if courts are al-
lowed to build jurisdictional barriers to discourage litigation at other court-
houses, we will surely miss out on the vast innovation that comes with the 
exchange of views on international law. For example, where the ECJ may 
decide to ignore the dispute settlement systems of UNCLOS, the law of the 
sea cases it decides will lose the benefit of the customs and jurisprudential 
doctrines ascribed to the text of the Convention. Competition among inter-
national tribunals will always encourage the peaceful settlement of legal 
disputes. Competition can help make better norms.
Once courts are aware of, and willing to acknowledge the deficiencies 
in their current stances surrounding jurisdiction collisions, how should they 
deal with the issue? A more comprehensive and predictable framework is 
clearly needed, one that informs states, individuals, corporations, non-profit 
organizations, and international lawyers about the limits of the different in-
stitutions’ jurisdiction. The answer may lie in adopting the three-part pro-
posal outlined in this note, which requires tribunals to wait before wading 
into matters currently being litigated elsewhere, but permits tribunals to de-
termine whether to retain a case based on its nature and urgency and the tri-
bunal’s own ability to provide remedies.
